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COGNITIVE DISSONANCE UNDERCUTS DETERRENCE IN THE CSUITE: WHY OTHERWISE ETHICAL FDA-DEPENDENT
MANAGERS KEEP FALLING DOWN THE RABBIT HOLE OF 10(B)
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
Edwin Adlam Herod*
I. INTRODUCTION
Inside or outside of the legal world, for most people, Enron,1
Madoff,2 and Theranos3 all conjure up images of investor fraud, white
collar crime, and executives-gone-bad. Those cases have involved
headline-grabbing securities violations4—among a host of other legal,
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Kenyon College. This
Comment would not have been possible without the support and guidance of Professor
Jacob Elberg—few others would appreciate spirited discussions on the contours
between incrementalism and induction.
1 History: Famous Cases & Criminals: Enron, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS,
https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/enron (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
2 United States v. Bernard L. Madoff and Related Cases, U.S. ATT’YS OFF., S. DIST. OF N.Y.,
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 5, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/programs/victimwitness-services/united-states-v-bernard-l-madoff-and-related-cases
[hereinafter
Madoff] (describing case status updates regarding Bernard Madoff).
3 Ben Popken, How $9 Billion Startup Theranos Blew Up and Laid off 41%, NBC NEWS
(Oct. 26, 2016, 12:45 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/how-9-billion-blood-testing-startup-theranos-blew-n671751.
4 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a range of charges against
all three actors listed—their managers, subsidies, and sometimes brothers—but all
included claims under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (“§
10(b)”). Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Kenneth L. Lay, Enron’s Former
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, with Fraud and Insider Trading (July 8, 2004),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-94.htm (SEC announcing § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 civil charges against the “former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Enron
Corp”); Complaint, SEC v. Bernard L. Madoff, No. 08-CIV-10791 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2008),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp-madoff121108.pdf
(SEC
complaint filed against Bernard L. Madoff and Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities
LLC with violations including § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); Press Release, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, SEC Charges Peter Madoff with Fraud and False Statements to Regulators (June
29, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2012-2012-126htm (charging
Peter Madoff—Bernard Madoff’s brother—with § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations);
Litigation Release No. 24069, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Securities and Exchange Commission
v. Elizabeth Holmes, et al. (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/
2018/lr24069.htm (SEC charging Elizabeth Holmes, Theranos Inc, and Ramesh Balwani
with § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations).
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ethical, psychological, and moral concerns. Some have contemplated
that these sensational scandals may stem from deeper psychological
issues.5 While these large-scale frauds capture the public’s imagination
due to the grand nature of the crimes,6 their impact on the day-to-day
securities litigation landscape is outsized by less dramatic cases.7 But
the public’s fascination with these large-scale frauds—and what drives
the actors behind them—may place too large of an onus on a smaller
subset of the overall problem.
Willful fraud, and the mindsets behind it, may grab significant
public attention, but a more elusive psychological phenomenon may
lurk behind a broad swath of securities actions: cognitive dissonance.
Cognitive dissonance, a process by which an actor can subconsciously
deceive herself about the quality and effect of her actions, differs
significantly from willful fraud: the actor may not comprehend the scope
or trajectory of her conduct.8 Understanding cognitive dissonance may
offer insight to increasing the law’s effectiveness as a deterrent and
providing counsel a better understanding of their clients’ actions to
advise prospectively and retrospectively. Some scholars have suggested
that cognitive dissonance has played a supporting role in larger
frauds—and is a mechanism that enables employees to go along with
the willfully fraudulent acts of their employers.9 This Comment will look
beyond the framework of cognitive dissonance as a supporting function
to examine the effect cognitive dissonance has when it takes a lead role
in securities violations.
With an average of $6 billion in settlements per year10 and
estimates of psychopathy in the general population at under one

Alan Deutschman, Is Your Boss a Psychopath?, FASTCOMPANY (July 1, 2005),
https://www.fastcompany.com/53247/your-boss-psychopath (Dr. Hare suggests,
indirectly, that the CFO of Enron, Andrew Fastow, exhibits psychopathic behavior);
Diana B. Henriques, Letters from a Sociopath, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2012, 6:00 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2012/0409/feature-bernie-madoff-prison-rewriteletters-from-sociopath.html#666235803167 (an article about the correspondence
between the author and Bernie Madoff); Jonathan Stempel, Ex-Theranos CEO Holmes
Puts Mental State at Issue, to be Examined by U.S. Experts, REUTERS (Sept. 10, 2020, 12:02
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-theranos-holmes/ex-theranos-ceo-holmesputs-mental-state-at-issue-to-be-examined-by-u-s-experts-idUSKBN2612Q3 (stating
that Elizabeth Holmes, of Theranos Inc, “may offer evidence she suffered from a mental
disease or defect”).
6 See supra notes 1–3.
7 See infra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
8 See discussion infra Sections V.A–D.
9 See Prentice, infra note 97, at 431.
10 MUKESH BAJAJ ET AL., ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES: THE REAL COSTS OF U.S. SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION LITIGATION, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 3 (Feb. 2014) [hereinafter
5
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percent,11 pinning the totality—or even a majority—of securities
violations on psychopathy and related mental illness seems farfetched.
Yet, the scope of the problem is substantial. While we cannot know the
total number of actual violations—and therefore the scope of total harm
to investors and the public—there is evidence that some companies are
not making the proper disclosures to the investing public: namely, the
$6 billion in settlements per year.12 The scale here prompts an
important question: Is there truly an incredible correlation between
management and psychopathy that grossly exceeds the population
average,13 or is there another, perhaps more reasoned explanation for
the psychological and ethical mindsets that bring corporate managers
to run afoul of securities law?
One sector that has borne the particular brunt of securities actions
based on the failure to make proper disclosures is the life sciences
sector: twenty-four percent of securities class action suits in 2019 were
filed against life sciences companies.14 Of particular note are the public
life science corporations on the lower capitalization side of the market.15
Due to complications with and significant dependencies on the Food and

Consequences], https://instituteforlegalreform.com/research/economic-consequences
-the-real-costs-of-u-s-securities-class-action-litigation/.
11 Kent A. Kiehl & Morris B. Hoffman, The Criminal Psychopath: History, Neuroscience,
Treatment, and Economics, 51 JURIMETRICS 355, 356 n.1 (2011) (indicating one-percent
of men in the general, institutionalized population and significantly lower estimates for
the general female population).
12 Consequences, supra note 10, at 2–3.
13 Some argue that there is data out there to show a skew towards narcissism and
psychopathy in the C-Suite, though this Comment will not go there, taking the tact that,
however much those numbers may vary, they do not represent a majority of these
instances of securities violations. See Karen Landay, Psychopaths in the C-Suite?, AM.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.apa.org/pubs/highlights/
spotlight/issue-123 (stating that “the results do not support the idea that corporate
leaders tend to have substantially higher levels of psychopathic tendencies”). But see
Jack McCullough, The Psychopathic CEO, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2019), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/jackmccullough/2019/12/09/the-psychopathic-ceo (stating
“[t]here is a real chance that at some point a chief financial officer will be confronted
with a psychopathic [CEO]”).
14 LaCroix, infra note 201; see also SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS, 2019 YEAR IN
REVIEW, CORNERSTONE RSCH. 1 (2020), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2019-Year-in-Review (stating that “[c]ompanies
in the Health Care sector were the most frequent targets of new core federal filings”).
Additionally, there appears to be a rise in securities class action filings in the life sciences
sector in 2019 over 2018. See MICHELE JOHNSON, COLLEEN SMITH & AMANDA BETSCH, RISE IN
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS IN LIFE SCIENCES SECTOR, IN VIVO 2 (2020), https://
www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/rise-securities-class-actions-life-sciences.
15 Nicki Locker & Laurie B. Smilan, 2019 Life Sciences Securities Litigation Roundup,
WILSON, SONSINI, GOODRICH, & ROSATI (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.wsgr.com/en/insights/2019-life-sciences-securities-litigation-roundup.html.
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Drug Administration (FDA)16 for approvals, life science companies—
and their managers—are beholden to a strange array of deadlines,
inspections, and notifications that ultimately makes or breaks the
business.17 Determining when and how to notify investors presents a
myriad of ethical and, ultimately, legal dilemmas.18
The failure to disclose material changes to investors, either
through misrepresentations or omissions, is a significant trigger for
class action suits in this sector. Under the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 (SEA), companies have disclosure obligations designed to
encourage truthful disclosures and discourage the misrepresentation or
omission of material facts to the investing public.19 Violations of the key
statute—SEA’s Section 10(b)—are limited by a mindset requirement:
often this requires the court to look at the facts and the circumstances
surrounding the disclosures managers and directors make to assess
whether they have the requisite scienter.20 The general internal
corporate processes that lead to running afoul of Section 10(b)—and
thus raising a cognizable claim of harm against managers and directors
on the part of investors21—are strangely similar in a myriad of cases.
While it is occasionally a matter of willful fraud or innocent confusion as
to the effect of an FDA notice, it is frequently a more complicated,
convoluted web of ego, confusion, loyalty, and bravado that plays out
between a variety of key corporate players. Where, exactly, the
manager—or managers—cross the line into the requisite scienter is not
always clear because a slow shuffle across the line is often harder to
catch in action but is still answerable in a suit.22
This Comment proposes that a significant percentage of securities
violations in the life sciences industry may be caused not by willful fraud

16 The FDA is a regulatory agency that regulates under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.S. §§ 301–399.
17 See infra Section III.A.
18 See Locker & Smilan, supra note 15.
19 It is unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
or any securities-based swap agreement[,] any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe.” See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (“Section 10(b)”).
20 See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
21 Investors bring civil claims under Section 10(b) of the SEA against managers and
directors who cause harm to investors through misrepresentations and omissions. See
15 U.S.C. § 78j.
22 Donald C. Langevoort, Disasters and Disclosures: Securities Fraud Liability in the
Shadow of a Corporate Catastrophe, 107 GEO. L.J. 967, 1004 (2019) (stating that most
courts look for a minimum mens rea of “conscious disregard” when establishing scienter
under a Section 10(b) suit).
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or innocent confusion, as other scholars have theorized,23 but by
corporate cognitive dissonance.
Cognitive dissonance exists when a person intakes two mutually
opposing facts.24 An individual is, by nature, uncomfortable maintaining
opposing facts, and, therefore, the brain seeks to eliminate this
differential.25 The discomfort created by dissonance is a driving force,
like hunger, that motivates an individual to seek resolution to the
discrepancy; that resolution is called consonance.26 Dissonance is
eliminated by (1) discarding old information or (2) distinguishing or
rejecting new facts.27 This process occurs regularly and is an essential
mental tool for organizing new information.28 Typically, the process
resolves by leaving the individual in internal consonance and relative
harmony with objective reality.29 But when an individual reaches
consonance falsely by manufacturing new facts, disregarding the scope
of new information, or wrongly distinguishing dissonant information,
that individual has lost the driving force to resolve the issue and may, in
ignorance, persist in believing his or her newly manufactured reality.30
The more complex the new information may be and the smaller the
objective difference between the dissonant facts, the easier it is to
distinguish the new information from the old without curing the
disconnect with reality.31 The individual may not be conscious or aware
of this process and that may inhibit his or her ability to course-correct
and avoid potential liability. 32 Cognitive dissonance may make many
violators of Section 10(b) unaware of their own missteps to the point
where the law loses effectiveness as a deterrent.33
Fraud or Confusion, infra note 90, at 1901.
FESTINGER, infra note 127, at 3.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 5–6.
28 Id. at 4–5.
29 If an individual is “more or less” in harmony with objective reality, the individual
in question does not believe any inherent falsehoods or fundamentally misunderstand
material facts about their environment, task, or conduct. For a discussion about
eliminating dissonance, see id. at 5.
30 By eliminating dissonance, the individual has lost the “hunger” to resolve a
problem and will now not seek a resolution, as the individual feels as though the issue
is resolved. See FESTINGER, infra note 127, at 3–5.
31 See discussion infra Sections V.A–D.
32 See Wright, infra note 119.
33 In addition, systematic deterrence reducers—such as indemnification and
insurance—look to lift the weight from managers and directors who may be concerned
about potential malfeasance. The indemnification and insurance provided to directors
and managers may reduce the financial threat intended to create deterrence. David B.
Shulz, Comment, Indemnification of Directors and Officers Against Liabilities Imposed
23
24
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A common example of this effect may occur in a victim of ongoing
fraud—such as a victim of Bernie Madoff34—who believes that the
perpetrator is a friend. But then the victim discovers new information
indicating that the victim has been misled. This information would be
sufficient to cause an objective person great concern and likely motivate
them to take action. But due to cognitive dissonance, if the prior belief
of friendship is strong enough, it can cause the new information to be
disregarded or distinguished in such a way that it loses all effect. Thus,
the victim is brought back into consonance. The result is that the victim
believes the friendship still exists and that the new fact was somehow
(1) false, (2) misleading, or (3) misunderstood. The victim has reduced
his dissonance—and the driving force to take action—but remains out
of sync with objective fact.
Rather than looking at how cognitive dissonance can enable
prolonged victimization, by affecting the victim, this Comment will turn
towards how cognitive dissonance can play a role in the wrongful
conduct itself. The purpose of this Comment is to develop an
understanding of the interactions between cognitive dissonance, FDA
notifications, and securities disclosures to (1) focus the law into a better
deterrent and (2) serve as a guide for counsel representing actors in this
space.
Public life sciences companies have a duty to make disclosures
under the SEA, and that duty includes refraining from omitting
necessary material facts.35 But determining the timing and scope of
disclosure may be difficult due to the complex multi-step process life
science companies commonly engage in with the FDA: information may
be disbursed in smaller-step changes, and its impact may be opaque.36
Subsequently, this Comment will focus on the effect of securities laws in
the life sciences sector: the combination of the two regulatory schemes
tends to produce a unique, partially repeatable pattern of behavior that
has, statistically, led to a higher rate of securities violations.
One of the key purposes of Rule 10b-5 is to deter fraudulent actors,
as violations negatively impact investor confidence, fluidity of capital
Under Federal Securities Laws, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 1043, 1065 (1995). Also, the stakes are
too high: over-disclosing to investors could cut managers off from the additional capital
they require to complete the task, risking the business; the indemnification-stifled
potential cost—and a seemingly remote chance of enforcement—may not be enough to
offer true deterrence. S. P. Kothari, Susan Shu & Peter D. Wysocki, Do Managers Withhold
Bad News?, 47 J. ACCT. RSCH. 241, 242 (2009).
34 A victim who has used an investor for a long period may form a trusting
relationship. See Madoff, supra note 2.
35 See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 61–89 and accompanying text.
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raises, and overall economic growth.37 Practitioners should be aware of
the hurdles cognitive dissonance places in front of relevant clients.
Changes to both securities laws and FDA regulations should take the
potential for cognitive dissonance into account to maximize the
effectiveness of securities law as a deterrent. The combination of the
engrained high-stakes of corporate management and cognitive
dissonance leads to a highly incentivized actor who is able to rationalize
each micro-step by employing mental tools to nullify cognitive
dissonance—and thus prospectively underestimate her own
malfeasance. This grave underestimation transforms high-stakes to
high-risk: one now has an actor who is despondent to deterrence
because she is unaware she is violating the law. Therefore, this
Comment proposes key modifications to the FDA, SEC, and corporate
charters that will encourage engagement throughout the slow-burn of
the FDA approval process in a manner that increases beneficial
disclosures and, by doing so, decreases lawsuits.
Part II of this Comment will provide background on the law
surrounding SEC disclosures and the impact of the FDA approval
process on public life sciences companies. Part III will discuss the
pitfalls that public life science companies face in determining how to
make proper SEC disclosures and how to keep the investing public
apprised of their status given any FDA notifications they may receive
while still driving investment in the company. Part IV will discuss the
commonly considered mindsets that contribute to Section 10(b)
liability, such as fraud or mistake. Part V will develop a third
possibility—cognitive dissonance—as a mildly opaque but frequent
psychological process that may account for a thus-far unrecognized
category of Section 10(b) violations. Part VI will explore a variety of
paths forward, including how the market and courts currently handle
this issue, as well as some additional considerations that could deter
additional violations. Part VII will conclude the Comment by
recommending a mixed approach to maximizing deterrence.
II. BACKGROUND
For public companies in the life sciences that depend primarily on
approvals from the FDA to generate revenue, the intersection of
securities disclosure requirements and FDA notifications creates a
challenging road for corporate managers to navigate—a road that, with
37 See 5B DISCLOSURE & REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS § 6:4 (2011) (stating that
the purposes of Rule 10b-5 include “deterring violations while compensating victims”
and “building investor confidence” while “assuring fairness”). See infra note 39 for a
description of Rule 10b-5, derived from Section 10(b).
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some frequency, ends in securities litigation under the SEA’s Section
10(b).38 The SEA also created the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), which administers and promulgates regulations, such as Rule
10b-5, which provides additional contours to Section 10(b).39 Public
corporate directors and managers, under the SEC regulations, have a
duty to disclose to the investing public “material events and
uncertainties known to management” that might reveal that publicly
reported financial information is not truly indicative of the
corporation’s condition within quarterly 10-Q and annual 10-K
submissions.40 Company managers are often faced with product
imperfections—and subsequent related communications from the
FDA—that require additional resources to overcome. Managers may
often need to respond to these “speed bumps” by raising additional
capital. But some of the product imperfections may eventually rise to
material issues that, should they not be disclosed, expose the company
to liability. This presents a conundrum to operators who cannot fix the
problem without capital but cannot raise capital if they disclose the
problem—and, frequently, when operators fail to thread this needle,
class action securities litigation occurs.
For a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, six factors must be
properly pleaded to make a prima facie case—but only two of those
factors are fertile grounds for conflict. The plaintiff must allege that
each defendant had the required scienter and that the facts that were
omitted or misrepresented were material. In order for a plaintiff to
successfully allege violations under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the
plaintiff must allege—particular to each defendant—that (1) the
defendant made a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) had
scienter in doing so; (3) the misrepresentation or omission had a
connection to the purchase or sale of a security by the plaintiff; (4) the
plaintiff relied on said misrepresentation or omission; (5) the plaintiff
suffered economic loss; and (6) there was a causal link between the
misrepresentation or omission and the plaintiff’s economic loss.41 The
15 U.S.C. § 78j.
15 U.S.C. § 78d (creating the Securities and Exchange Commission). Additional
regulations promulgated by the SEC under 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (“Rule 10b-5”) make it
unlawful for companies to make an “untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances . . . not misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2021).
40 Katherine Cohen, Joseph W. Cormier & Mahnu V. Davar, Predictable Materiality:
Need for Common Criteria Governing Disclosure of Clinical Trial Results by PubliclyTraded Pharmaceutical Companies, 29 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201, 215 (2013)
(citing 17 C.F.R. § 229.303) [hereinafter Predictable Materiality].
41 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 38 (2011) (citing Stoneridge
Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008)); see also 15 U.S.C.
38
39
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plaintiff, however, is relieved from pleading with any great detail
whether or how the misrepresentation or omission had a connection to
the sale, or if the plaintiff justifiably relied on the misstatement or
omission, by the “fraud on the market” theory: it is enough to say that
the misstatement occurred, and the plaintiff, subsequently, made a stock
transaction, and that there was causation that triggered an economic
loss.42 This leaves, as the primary challenge for plaintiffs to survive a
motion to dismiss, alleging that the facts omitted or misstated were
material and that the defendants had the required scienter when the
omissions or misstatements were made.
There is a complex interplay between materiality of facts and the
corporate managers’ scienter.43 Scienter requires that the defendants
have a mindset of knowledge or recklessness—this is frequently
interpreted by courts as a “conscious disregard” standard: the
defendant had some awareness that the behavior was improper, but
decided to disregard the information and move forward despite it.44
Scienter has been adequately alleged in a complaint “only if a reasonable
person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as
compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts
alleged.”45 The materiality of facts can circumstantially inform the level
of scienter the defendants are accused of having acted with.46 Therefore,
the determination of the materiality of facts, and any circumstantial
evidence as to the knowledge or awareness of the defendants of the
materiality of those facts, will be highly probative as to the defendant’s
scienter.

§ 78u-4. Given the relatively low bar for surviving a F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss—which is the primary way to keep litigation costs low for defendants—it is
vitally important to be aware of the line created by the Court’s interpretation of Rule
10b-5. See Matrixx, 563 U.S. at 45 n.12. Additionally, it must be noted that the Supreme
Court has allowed the standard of recklessness to be assumed without being “decided.”
Id. at 48.
42 Basic affirmed the “fraud on the market” theory, which relieves plaintiffs of the
burden of proving that they specifically relied upon the material omission or
misstatement in their purchase; it only requires that the misleading statement was
made and that the stock purchase occurred. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242,
247 (1988).
43 Thomas M. Madden, Significance and the Materiality Tautology, 10 J. BUS. & TECH. L.
217, 225 (looking at the “close relationship” between materiality and scienter, as
explored by the First Circuit).
44 Langevoort, supra note 22 at 1004 (stating that most courts look for a minimum
mens rea of “conscious disregard” when establishing scienter under a § 10(b) suit).
45 Matrixx, 563 U.S. at 48 (internal quotations omitted).
46 Madden, supra note 43 (quoting Miss. Pub. Emp.’s Ret. Sys. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 549
F.3d 5, 20 (1st Cir. 2011)) (“Knowingly omitting material informative is probative,
although not determinative, of materiality.”).
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For example, in Matrixx v. Siracusano, the Court decided it was a
“cogent and compelling” inference that there was scienter when the
company chose not to disclose reports; it was not because they thought
they were immaterial, but rather because they “understood their likely
effect on the market.”47 Additionally, the Court, in Matrixx, made an
express point of noting, “[m]ost significantly,” that Matrixx issued a
press release referring to non-existent studies that proved its
medication, Zicam, did not cause the adverse effects it was accused of
causing.48 The indication here is that the level of materiality of the issue
will inform the Court’s interpretation of the defendant’s scienter—the
more important the matter is to the operations of the business, the more
likely a manager or director is aware of the “likely effect” on the
market.49
This prompts a much needed look into materiality: a helpful first
step in determining materiality for SEC disclosures is to examine the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Basic v. Levinson.50 In Basic, the Court
established a standard that eliminated “certain information . . . of
‘dubious significance’” that would risk overwhelming investors with “an
avalanche of trivial information.”51 The Court tightened-up the
materiality standard so that, while it is still what is material from the
viewpoint of a “reasonable investor,” it requires the information to have
a “substantial likelihood” that it will have “significantly altered the ‘total
mix’ of information available.”52 This at least works to account for the
fact that any reasonable investor would likely want to claim that any
detrimental fact not disclosed is material. But this “total mix” standard
only goes so far as a protection for most companies, and for
pharmaceuticals where a single FDA approval will gravely impact the
bottom line, this does not provide a lot of leeway. The “total mix” of
information for a public, small-cap pharmaceutical is information
organized around a product line of one, two, or three products; any
meaningful FDA feedback could jeopardize the very existence of one of
those products—or require a significant recapitalization in order to
47 Matrixx, 563 U.S. at 49 (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 323–24 (2007)).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus. v.
Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976)) (holding that there “must be a substantial likelihood
that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available”).
51 Id. at 231 (quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976)).
52 Id. at 231–32 (quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976)) (emphasis
added).
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redevelop the product.53 Due to the grave impact of that information, it
tends to take on a high level of importance in the overall scheme of
information available on the company, and it is, therefore, likely to
exceed the “total mix” standard.54 The Court, in Matrixx, upheld its factintensive analysis of materiality in the context of pharmaceuticals.55
Over the last several decades, both Congress and the judicial
branch have sought to refine the contours of the burdens placed on both
plaintiffs and defendants in the initial phases of Section 10(b) cases.
Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PLSRA”)
in 1995 to reduce meritless class action securities actions by increasing
the pleading standard.56 But these suits have continued.57 The United
States Supreme Court has, through Basic and Matrixx, made it easier for
plaintiffs to file these suits.58 While Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund
provided defendants with the ability to rebut the plaintiff’s presumption
of reliance,59 other cases, like Arkansas Teacher Retirement System v.
Goldman Sachs, have expanded potential liability for defendants: the
Second Circuit, in Goldman Sachs, lowered the bar necessary to establish
harm through an “Inflation Maintenance Theory” that allows for
plaintiffs to establish harm without showing a change in the market.60
III. PITFALLS LIFE SCIENCE COMPANIES FACE SURROUNDING SEC DISCLOSURES
While Section 10(b) presents challenges to various industries,
there are unique challenges to public life science companies,
particularly companies on the smaller capitalized side that rely on one
or two products—and the FDA to approve those products—to provide
See discussion infra Section III.A (discussing the impact of a CLR).
See infra note 74 for an example of FDA notifications triggering high-media
coverage in small-cap pharmaceuticals.
55 See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 39 (2011).
56 Consequences, supra note 10, at 5.
57 Id. at 7.
58 By instituting a “total mix” approach in Basic, and then supporting that same
approach in the context of life science companies in Matrixx, the Court increased the
likelihood of small-capitalized public life science companies having any change in one
product be material. See supra notes 42–55 and accompanying text. Basic also affirmed
the “fraud on the market” theory, which eliminates the need for the plaintiff to prove
reliance on the disclosure or omission. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242, 247
(1988).
59 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 279 (2014) (holding that
a defendant may rebut the presumption of price impact at the class certification stage).
60 The “Inflation Maintenance Theory” operates on the assumption that, if the
company had not made the materially misleading disclosure (or omission), the price
would have dropped earlier, and thus the purchaser of that stock has overpaid, and that
is the harm. See Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 955 F.3d 254, 265–
66 (2d Cir. 2020).
53
54
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profits to their shareholders. It is important to look at two key elements:
first, the requirements to gain—and retain—FDA approval for life
sciences products; and second, how the SEC disclosure requirements
interact with FDA notifications.
A. The FDA Approval Process: A Tale of Inspections and
Notifications
The FDA approval process can vary depending on the particular
piece of biotechnology, traditional drug, or biologic a company is
attempting to bring to market.61 As an example, this Comment will focus
on the application process for biologics: these are large molecule,
complicated medicines created through a biological process; this means
that the company creating the molecule and the subsequent approval
process is firmly tied to the manufacturing facility in which it is
created.62 While this Comment will focus on issues that occur during the
approval process of new biologics, there are other areas, including postapproval actions, where similar issues may arise between companies
and the FDA relevant to this discussion.
Pharmaceutical research and development is a costly endeavor.
The mean cost to bring a single drug to market between 2009 and 2018
was $1.33 billion.63 And when one adds the additional manufacturing
specifications, approvals, and location-commitments, biologics are high
cost with low mobility, as a company’s approval process is anchored to
the manufacturing facility in which it chooses to root its business.64 If
problems present themselves down the road—after a company is tied
to a particular facility—the sunk costs can present a major mental
obstacle to forsake.

61 Industry Frequently Asked Questions, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 26, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/industry/fda-basics-industry/industry-frequently-asked-questions (offering approval paths for Animal & Veterinary Drugs, Medical Devices, Radiation-Emitting Products, and Drugs).
62 What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-biologics-evaluation-and-research-cber/whatare-biologics-questions-and-answers; Emily Singer, Why is Biomanufacturing So Hard?,
MIT TECH. REV. (July 15, 2011), https://www.technologyreview.com/2011/07/15/
192981/why-is-biomanufacturing-so-hard/ (stating that not only must the drug itself
be approved, but “the manufacturing procedure must be approved as well”).
63 Millions, infra note 64.
64 Mark Terry, The Median Cost of Bringing a Drug to Market is $985 Million,
According to New Study, BIOSPACE (Mar. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Millions],
https://www.biospace.com/article/median-cost-of-bringing-a-new-drug-to-market985-million/; Singer, supra note 62 (stating that not only must the drug itself be
approved, but “the manufacturing procedure must be approved as well”).
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Companies must begin by conducting their own testing and
development phase—taking an average of over eight years—ranging
from computer modeling to microorganism and animal testing.65 A
company must then go through the Investigational New Drug (IND)
process in order to conduct human testing to determine if its product is
safe.66 Once early human trials are complete, the company files a
Biologics License Application (BLA) with the FDA to indicate that they
are ready to bring the drug into interstate commerce.67 The FDA then
conducts inspections on the manufacturing facility.68 If the FDA
determines there may be a violation of applicable law—through
inspection of the facility, reports, lab results, or other findings—the FDA
will issue a Form 483 to management.69 The Form 483 is “discussed
with [the] company’s management at the conclusion of the inspection
. . . [and] each observation is read and discussed so that there is a full
understanding of what the observations are and what they mean.”70 The
FDA follows the Form 483 by sending an Establishment Inspection
Report (EIR) that details the precise issues uncovered in the
inspection.71 The company can then submit a response to the FDA, and

65 The Beginnings: Laboratory and Animal Studies, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 27,
2015), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-information-consumers/beginnings-laboratory-and-animal-studies; How Do I Go About Getting a Drug Approved?, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.fda.gov/industry/fda-basics-industry/how-do-igo-about-getting-drug-approved.
66 Development & Approval Process (CBER), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 25, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/development-approval-process-cber
(stating that an “Investigational New Drug Application (IND) is a request for
authorization from the [FDA] to administer an investigational drug or biological product
to humans”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG
EVALUATION & RSCH. (CDER), GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND REVIEWERS: EXPLORATORY IND
STUDIES 3–4 (2006), https://www.fda.gov/media/72325/download (explaining the
purpose and scope of an IND).
67 Development & Approval Process, supra note 66 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 601.2); see also
Biologics License Applications (BLA) Process (CBER), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/development-approval-processcber/biologics-license-applications-bla-process-cber (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
68 See, e.g., Mulligan v. Impax Lab’ys, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 3d 942, 948 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18,
2014). Additionally, once a biologic is certified by the FDA, biennial inspections will
commence; therefore, a Form 483, and the subsequent string of FDA actions, can
commence later in a product’s lifecycle, should the manufacturing conditions change.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BIOLOGIC COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 5 (2010), https://www.fda.gov/
media/73834/download (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
69 Form 483 Frequently Asked Questions, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 9, 2020)
[hereinafter FDA FAQ], https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcementand-criminal-investigations/inspection-references/fda-form-483-frequently-askedquestions.
70 Id.
71 Id.
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if the FDA finds that response lacking in regard to a violation of
regulatory significance, it will issue a “Warning Letter.”72 Finally, the
company either receives an approval letter, or the company receives a
Complete Response Letter (CRL)—which effectively denies the drug’s
approval.73
There can be a month-long or a many month-long gap between the
receipt of a Form 483 and a CRL.74 When a company is caught in such a
window, the company faces some degree of knowledge regarding the
challenge it faces to right the ship as well as the need to fund solutions.
The FDA has a process, after a Form 483 is submitted, to allow a
company to make corrections.75 This process is essential—but also
dangerous—because, as discussed below, it is fertile earth for the
induction of cognitive dissonance76 due to the opaqueness, malleability,
and, often, the small-step changes required to mend a perceived
problem. The process, thus, creates opportunities for managers to
subconsciously self-manipulate their own understandings of the
viability of the product.
B. How SEA Disclosures Interact with The FDA Approval Process
Against the backdrop of securities law, when FDA-related
interactions—clinical results, positive or negative, or FDA notices—
occur, how do managers of smaller public corporations determine their
materiality? Negative clinical results can lead to questions of materiality
if a reasonable investor would be impacted by knowledge of that result,
if that result would have a grave effect on the “total mix” of information

72 Mulligan, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 947–48 (quoting FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATORY
PROCEDURES MANUAL 4.1 (2012)) (“The FDA’s policy states that a Warning Letter ‘should
not be issued if the agency concludes that a firm’s corrective actions are adequate and
the violations that would have supported the letter have been corrected.’”).
73 What is an FDA Complete Response Letter?, MOTLEY FOOL (Feb. 16, 2017),
https://www.fool.com/knowledge-center/what-is-a-fda-complete-response-letter.aspx.
74 Immunomedics is an example of a small-cap public pharmaceutical that endured
a progression of Form 483 difficulties over many months, making multiple public
disclosures while managing the evolving FDA notifications. See, e.g., Eric Palmer,
Troubled Immunomedics Now Hit with CRL for Breast Cancer Drug Candidate, FIERCE
PHARMA (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.fiercepharma.com/manufacturing/troubledimmunomedics-now-hit-crl-for-breast-cancer-mab; Odeh v. Immunomedics, Inc., No.
18-17645, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135917, at *10–11 (D.N.J. July 31, 2020) (receiving Form
483 in August 2018 and a CRL in January 2019).
75 What Should I Expect During an Inspection?, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 26, 2016),
https://www.fda.gov/industry/fda-basics-industry/what-should-i-expect-during-inspection.
76 See discussion infra Section V.E.
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about the business.77 But even positive clinical results can present a
liability to the company if that result is given outsized weight in
communications and is eventually not dispositive of the product’s
viability.78 Yet, the real landmine is the Form 48379—and the
subsequent threat of a CRL80—because a Form 483 can signify a range
of problems (scaling from solvable to unsolvable). And, since the
number of opportunities the FDA will provide to correct the error is
unknowable, the value of the Form 483 can be an unknown variable.81
A Form 483 presents a tangible problem—but a problem that can
possibly be solved, per FDA protocol.82 By presenting a cryptic pathway
to success—difficult to understand in scope, course, number of
permissible attempts, and time to act—a Form 483 notice can open the
door to a slippery slope that could end in a CRL. And, notably, the road
from the former to the latter has plenty of opportunities to run afoul of
the material disclosure requirements along the way.
Like all public companies, public, small-capitalized pharmaceutical
companies have a duty to disclose 83 in their quarterly Form 10-Q and
annual Form 10-K submissions “material events and uncertainties
known to management that would cause reported financial information
77 Predictable Materiality, supra note 84, at 222–27 (discussing the materiality of
negative clinical trial results).
78 When a manager overemphasizes positive clinical results, this may happen while
excluding other, less favorable data—and should the product, in the end, fail, investors
may perceive the positive clinical results as a biased way of manipulating investor
response. Predictable Materiality, supra note 84, at 220–22 (discussing the effect of
overstating positive clinical results).
79 A notice provided by the FDA that finds faults in the drug approval process that
must be rectified. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
80 A Complete Response Letter (CRL) is a final notice by the FDA that a drug or
biologic application is denied. See MOTLEY FOOL, supra note 73 and accompanying text.
81 See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
82 Misleading mandatory disclosures that follow from a Form 483 are, on their own,
insufficient to find a mandatory Form 10-K disclosure misleading. See Schaeffer v.
Nabriva Therapeutics PLC, No. 19-4183, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78035, at *31–32 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 28, 2020) (citing In re Discovery Lab’ys Sec. Litig., No. 06-1820, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18163 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2007)). But a Form 483 “represents a risk that the FDA may
take corrective action, . . . and thus a company is obligated to assess the seriousness of
the risk and disclose such information to potential investors if it also represents it is in
compliance with the FDA regulations . . . .” Pub. Pension Fund Grp. v. KV Pharm. Co., 679
F.3d 972, 982 (8th Cir. 2012). If a Form 483 is not likely to, on its own, create liability,
it can frequently be a key piece in the beginning of misleading material disclosures. See,
e.g., Odeh v. Immunomedics, Inc., No. 18-17645, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135917, at *6
(D.N.J. July 31, 2020); Mulligan v. Impax Lab’ys, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 3d 942, 947–48 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 18, 2014).
83 See generally Stuart R. Cohn & Erin M. Swick, Sitting Ducks of Securities Class Action
Litigation: Bio-Pharmas and the Need for Improved Evaluation of Scientific Data, 35 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 911, 912 (2010).
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not to be necessarily indicative of future operating results or of future
financial condition.”84 Additionally, should circumstances change by
way of a “reportable event,” companies are required to disclose material
changes in a Form 8-K.85 Finally, asynchronous “voluntary disclosures”
that many managers make—whether on an investors’ call, to the media,
or at an event—still carry the burden of not being materially
misleading.86 It is essential to note that the timing of the Form 10-Q and
Form 10-K reports have no bearing whatsoever on potential
notifications from the FDA: FDA notifications are correlated to the BLA
application process and inspection timing, and the SEC notifications are
scheduled against the company’s fiscal year.87 This means, on receipt of
an FDA notification, management may already be in progress of
releasing a scheduled Form 10-Q or Form 10-K, or a voluntary Form 8K. Therefore, receipt of any Form 483s, EIRs, or CRLs will often lead to
a two-prong decision: (1) what action is required to correct the business
or scientific problem? And (2) is this a material change to the
business—also known as: Must I disclose this? The more substantial the
level of difficulty rendered by the former seems to implicate a higher
likelihood of the latter; however, it is not clear when disclosure is
required. Therefore, the manager might lobby for time to neutralize the
problem before making a disclosure that would risk upsetting the apple
cart—and subsequently losing shareholder value and the potential to
raise additional capital. After all, if this is part of the natural—perhaps
even typical—progression of the FDA approval process, is it essential or
wise to disclose immediately? Additionally, if disclosures are already
pending, the timing of this notice can make it difficult to withdraw or
edit a currently outbound disclosure.
And a recent disclosure that is now rendered incorrect creates a
second problem. Even providing that it may be permissible not to
disclose specific information on the prior date of disclosure, the
company may move on to make other, unrelated disclosures. But, not
only must those disclosures not contain materially misleading
information, but they cannot “omit . . . a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in [ ] light of the circumstances under

Predictable Materiality, supra note 40, at 215.
Id. at 216.
86 Langevoort, supra note 22, at 979 (stating that many disclosure issues arise from
voluntary disclosures).
87 See Predictable Materiality, supra note 40, at 224–225 (discussing the duty to
disclose under SEC regulations); see also supra notes 65–75 and accompanying text
(discussing the unscheduled and unpredictable FDA process, in order to infer that there
is no correlation between these two processes).
84
85
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which they were made, not misleading.”88 Therefore, should the
company make a disclosure, ignoring the issue at hand, it is possible that
making an otherwise neutral statement about the company may imply
that the “problem”—which the company is now aware of—does not
exist, and therefore, has been omitted in violation of Rule 10b-5.89
IV. TRADITIONAL FRAMEWORK OF CORPORATE MINDSETS THAT LEAD TO
SECTION 10(B) VIOLATIONS
Given the difficulties expressed in the sections above, it can be easy
to see how the traditional perspectives on corporate mindsets have
dwelt on two extreme ends of the spectrum: managers acting either
fraudulently or innocently, due to confusion. This section will briefly
look at Eric Schmid’s Fraud or Confusion, which looks to bifurcate the
possible managerial mindsets into two distinct categories: fraud and
confusion.90 The Note sophisticatedly proposes these two opposite
polls and then suggests a variety of solutions for each cause.91 This
section will briefly touch on a willfully fraudulent mindset and a
confusion-driven innocent mindset.
A. The Frequency of Willful Fraud
Willful fraud—a term that exceeds any statutory mens rea
requirement concerning Section 10(b)—may well exist on the market,
but it is a “more radical conclusion.”92 We can look at a host of cases
through the ages—ZZZZ Best,93 Enron,94 HealthSouth95—and determine
that willful fraud exists. The enormity of the scale, both in impact and

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2021).
See Levie v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 04-7643, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12725, at *15–
16 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2006) (stating that omitting the fact that merger negotiations were
taking place from an announcement about a store purchase could rise to a material fact
omission under Rule 10b-5 and was enough to deny a motion to dismiss).
90 Eric Schmid, Fraud or Confusion: A Pill for Chronic Securities Litigation in The Life
Sciences Sector, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1899, 1928 (2020) [hereinafter Fraud or Confusion].
91 Id. at 1901.
92 Id. at 1927–28.
93 See In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 964 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (plaintiffs
allege “[ZZZZ] Best’s glamorous aura was a sham, and that a massive fraud was
perpetrated in connection with the public trading of [the company]”).
94 In re Enron Corp. Sec., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 637 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (stating that the
materially “False and misleading Statements” were a “deliberate failure” on Enron’s
part) (emphasis added).
95 In re Healthsouth Corp. Ins. Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1259 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 16,
2004) (“[G]uilty pleas entered by former HealthSouth officers and employees indicate
that much of HealthSouth’s unprecedented growth may have been the result of
unprecedented fraud.”).
88
89
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in the array of complicit actors,96 makes Enron (and frauds like it) a
challenging story for the public to understand for a multitude of reasons,
including that it conflicts with the rational actor theory.97
Willful fraud cases commonly appear to have a central bad actor or
small group of bad actors operating knowingly. Conflicts of interest
often mire cases of willful fraud.98 For example, in WorldCom, Bernard
J. Ebbers, the CEO of WorldCom, became overleveraged when, after
engaging in margin calls with his WorldCom stock, the price dropped
due to a merger denial by the Department of Justice (DOJ).99 The facts,
as alleged by the plaintiffs, state that an agreement between senior staff
at the company started in 2000 when they were directed to “do
whatever was necessary to get WorldCom’s ‘margins back in line.’”100
WorldCom manipulated its books to inflate its earnings.101 This fraud
persisted until it unraveled in 2002.102 Ebbers was conflicted between
his obligations to his company and saving himself from potential legal
action; on the other hand, Ebber’s employees and Board of Directors
were conflicted between their obligations to the company and their
loyalty to Ebbers.103
While Enron’s key actors may have been actively aware of the
fraudulent accounting practices they were engaging in, Professor
Robert Prentice suggested that their direct reports may not have come
forward to expose the fraud due to cognitive dissonance.104 He
proposed that cognitive dissonance allowed many of the employees who
were not acting willfully fraudulently to continue to act in the business
despite conflicting facts.105 This Comment will explore, below, how
cognitive dissonance can be a factor in the primary actor’s conduct.

See History: Famous Cases & Criminals: Enron, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS,
https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/enron (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
97 Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 417, 427–28
(2003).
98 Crucible, infra note 122, at 4.
99 Troy Segal, 5 Most Publicized Ethics Violations by CEOs, INVESTOPEDIA (May 9, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0113/5-most-publicized-ethics-violations-by-ceos.aspx.
100 In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
101 Id. at 400.
102 Segal, supra note 99.
103 Id.
104 Prentice, supra note 97, at 431.
105 Id.
96
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B. Confusion About FDA Policy as a Defense
Looking at the other end of the spectrum, there exists the notion
that managers are merely confused by the specifics of the FDA approval
process, and such confusion leads to incidental fraud on the market. In
Fraud or Confusion, Schmid suggests that FDA notifications are
inherently confusing, and that makes it impossible for managers, in
some instances, to be aware of potential disclosure errors.106
Fraud or Confusion looks to Levi v. Atossa Genetics, Inc.,107 out of the
Ninth Circuit, as a case involving FDA related confusion.108 In one
instance, Atossa correctly described the FDA clearance of its MASCT
System in its IPO documents, stating that it had received limited FDAcertification for an express purpose.109 But in a separate instance in the
IPO documents, the company described the MASCT System as fully
“FDA-cleared.”110 This made the product appear further along and more
imminently profitable—the court described this as Atossa using “less
precise language” (“Incident Two”).111 Schmind, in Fraud or Confusion,
discusses the implications of this confusion as “creat[ing] liabilit[ies] for
life science companies that unintentionally misinterpret materiality in
one of the most complex, highly regulated sectors.”112 Schmind leaves
us with a rational concern that, scientifically, “reasonable minds may
differ,” and such “disagreements could equate to misstatements of
material fact under SEC regulations.”113 The issues raised in Atossa,
however, were more extensive than a single misstatement. And
curiously, all misunderstandings seemed to err in favor of Atossa. This
Comment will review this case, with a new perspective, after discussing
cognitive dissonance in depth.
V. CORPORATE COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: QUANTITATIVE EASING FOR
MANAGERS’ MINDSETS
This Part looks at the spectrum that exists between the opposite
poles of confusion and willful fraud. This grayscale can exist as a static
construct—the actor never fully innocent nor willfully fraudulent—and
it can exist as a course of action, over time, building to knowingly or

106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

See Fraud or Confusion, supra note 90, at 1925–26.
Levi v. Atossa Genetics, Inc., 868 F.3d 784, 789–90 (9th Cir. 2017).
Fraud or Confusion, supra note 90, at 1925–26.
Atossa, 868 F.3d at 796.
Id.
Id.
Fraud or Confusion, supra note 90, at 1926.
Id.
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recklessly fraudulent behavior. C-Suite-wide cognitive dissonance114 is
a product of groupthink115 and the individual manager or director’s
desire to eliminate conflicting inputs while maintaining forward
momentum. The elimination of these dissonant elements may occur
consciously or unconsciously. Notably, the less conscious the behavior,
the more difficult the behavior is to deter. As securities laws are
designed to deter harmful behaviors and to remediate when deterrence
has failed,116 understanding how cognitive dissonance may impede
deterrence is relevant to evaluating the effectiveness of existing
securities law.
Securities laws are designed to deter harmful behaviors and to
remediate when deterrence has failed.117 Remediation functions by
compensating victims and reaffirming notions of justice, which, in turn,
boosts confidence in the marketplace.118 Deterrence, by its very nature,
requires a level of knowledge about one’s own actions prior to or in the
course of the conduct.119 Traditionally, mens rea creates a demarcation
point for culpability: it can be seen as “just” to punish the behavior when
the actor had some level of awareness, and thus, an ability to have
avoided the conduct.120 This makes mens rea a focal point for both just
ex post remediation and prospective deterrence. Looking at a series of
events retrospectively, it may be possible to find the necessary mens rea
at the point of action. But looking at that same series of events
prospectively—from the vantage point of the actor prior to taking the
action—cognitive dissonance may make it nearly impossible for an
actor to understand the conduct and its consequences prior to and
114 Merriam-Webster defines “cognitive dissonance” as “psychological conflict resulting from incongruous beliefs and attitudes held simultaneously.” Cognitive Dissonance,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cognitive%20dissonance (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
115 See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
116 5B DISCLOSURE & REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS § 6:4 (2011) (stating that the
purposes of Rule 10b-5 include “deterring violations while compensating victims” and
“building investor confidence” while “assuring fairness”).
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 When people lack awareness that their behavior is criminal, there is likely no
deterrent effect. See VALERIE WRIGHT, SENT’G PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT 2 (2010) (stating that people with a
“temporarily impaired capacity to consider the pros and cons of their actions” lack the
ability to be deterred from the conduct).
120 In order to avoid conduct, one must have self-awareness of the conduct. See
Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741, 744–45 (1993) (stating
that mens rea effectively imposes “a requirement that the person charged possessed, at
the time of the offense, subjective awareness of the ‘true’ or objective nature of his or
her own conduct”).

HEROD (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

11/12/21 3:49 PM

COMMENT

627

including the moment of the conduct. Mens rea may only look to the
moment of actus reus, but the more time, prior to the act, an actor has,
the more opportunity that actor has to choose not to do the action:
hence, more prospective awareness can aid in maximizing the deterrent
effect. Understanding how this behavior develops over time is highly
relevant in modeling how to prevent the behavior.
For example, in the framework of a bank robbery, there are clear,
possible steps of escalation: attaining a gun (legally or illegally);
assembling a group to act; walking into a bank; and pulling out the gun
inside a bank branch. Each substantial step leads to another and
requires a relatively significant choice—and thus an inferable
mindset.121
In securities law, each choice can be much smaller: for example,
stalling a disclosure for a few days until more information is available;
not disclosing a third Form 483 when the manager is convinced some
progress was made; hosting an investors’ call and explaining away a
very negative Form 483 as “part of the normal process;” or issuing a
press release explaining that the company is still on track for approval,
even though some advisors have suggested a Warning Letter may be on
its way. Instead of a series of significant steps, the path to violating
Section 10(b) begins to look more like a smooth curve. The practical
result of which is that you may have a culpable mens rea retrospectively:
a factfinder may review a pattern of behavior and determine that, at the
time of the wrongful act or omission, the individual was exhibiting a
conscious disregard of their known duty to disclose—and therefore, the
law can remediate appropriately. But because the steps are infinitely
smaller, the effectiveness of the law as a deterrent drops precipitously
because the actor will have difficulty differentiating between the steps
due to cognitive dissonance. Because of this slow progression, the actor
may or may not consciously understand the level of his or her violation.
Therefore, this Part will analyze the effect of cognitive dissonance
in the C-Suite of small-capitalized, public life science companies in order
to understand where adjustments may be made in the law, or via advice
from counsel, that would reinforce the deterrent effect of Section 10(b).
Moving forward, we will exclude sociopaths, psychopaths, and any other
person who is “uninhibited” by a typical set of moral, social, or ethical
limitations. This is, by no means, to suggest that the C-Suite is magically
insulated from such individuals, but statistically, we are dealing with a

121 See Steven R. Morrison, The System of Modern Criminal Conspiracy, 63 CATH. U. L.
REV. 371, 408–10 (2014) (discussing how otherwise innocent acts may establish mens
rea independently or through a series of actions and subsequent inferences).
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broader problem.122 First, this Part will look at how cognitive
dissonance is a driving force for an individual to seek consonance
through behavioral or belief changes. Second, this Part will discuss
cognitive dissonance as a subjective state of mind—and a driving force
for self-resolution—juxtaposed against external, objective cognitive
dissonance. Third, this Part will analyze how an individual can maintain
dissonance, despite the inevitable drive to consonance. Fourth, this Part
will develop the theory that cognitive easing can work to ease subjective
cognitive dissonance at the cost of losing objectivity both individually
and as a management group. Fifth, this Part will analyze how those tools
apply to both the corporate environment and public life science
companies. Sixth, this Part will take a fresh look at Atossa. And lastly,
this Part will explain why this is a relevant determination.
A. What is Cognitive Dissonance?
For an individual, cognitive dissonance develops when new
information conflicts with existing information.123 Cognitive dissonance
compels the mind to eliminate or diminish the dissonance, reaching
consonance.124 Individuals lose objectivity when new, conflicting
information is distinguished and subsumed into the former fact,
eliminating internal dissonance, but establishing an objectively
incorrect belief in the process.125 Corporate cognitive dissonance may
result in an actor having the necessary mens rea to be culpable under
Section 10(b), but it inhibits the actor from recognizing the conduct
prospectively and, therefore, greatly reduces the potential deterrence
effect.

122 See Scott Killingsworth, ‘C’ is for Crucible: Behavioral Ethics, Culture, and the
Board’s Role in C-Suite Compliance, RAND CENTER FOR CORPORATE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE
SYMPOSIUM WHITE PAPER SERIES, SYMPOSIUM ON “CULTURE, COMPLIANCE & THE C-SUITE: HOW
EXECUTIVES AND POLICYMAKERS CAN BETTER SAFEGUARD AGAINST MISCONDUCT AT THE TOP” 1 (May
29, 2013) [hereinafter Crucible], https://ssrn.com/abstract=2271840 (suggesting that
“C-Suite psychopaths exist and do great damage, but they are not the source of most
corporate compliance failures”).
123 See FESTINGER, infra note 127, at 3–4.
124 Id.
125 See Clay Halton, Cognitive Dissonance, INVESTOPEDIA (July 19, 2019), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cognitive-dissonance.asp, for an explanation of cognitive dissonance within an investment setting.
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B. Cognitive Dissonance is Like Hunger
Cognitive dissonance, like hunger, has a natural desire to eliminate
itself.126 Cognitive dissonance frequently occurs; however, it is typically
resolved instantaneously, placing the individual back into
consonance.127
For a simplistic example, person A was told by person B yesterday
that it would be sunny today.128 Person A believes person B and,
therefore, intends to go to the park.129 Upon looking out the window,
person A discovers that it is not sunny, but storming. This new fact
creates dissonance; for a moment, the competing information exists
simultaneously within person A’s mind—maintaining both the belief of
the day as it should have been and the day that it appears to be.130 But
typically, rationality prevails, eliminating the dissonance.131 Despite the
desire to go to the park, the superior, clear facts win out over the
personal motivation.
But sometimes, facts are not easy to reconcile. As an alternative to
the example above, one might imagine a scenario where a victim of a
sophisticated, fraudulent investment scheme might be tempted to
follow the adage “in for a penny, in for a pound,” despite discovering
worrisome facts about their would-be defrauder. Even with clear,
superior facts—for instance, a news report on the fraud—the victim
might find that many pressures—such as financial dependencies or
interpersonal relationships—deter an easy resolution of the factual
dilemma. This creates persistent dissonance that the victim will be
instinctually drawn to eliminate, per Dr. Leon Festinger above, bringing
himself back into consonance.
The magnitude of the fact misalignment amplifies the
uncomfortable dissonance.
Festinger states that “[c]ognitive
dissonance can be seen as an antecedent condition which leads to
activity oriented towards dissonance reduction just as hunger leads to
activity oriented toward hunger reduction.”132 Each fact, internalized by
the individual, becomes a “cognitive element,” and the greater the
significance attributed to the competing cognitive elements, the greater

126
127
128
129
130
131
132

FESTINGER, infra note 127, at 3.
See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 4–5 (1957).
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
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the magnitude of the dissonance.133 Generally, a greater magnitude of
dissonance leads to a stronger drive to reduce or eliminate the
dissonance.134
In the case of our hypothetical fraud victim, the magnitude of the
dissonance is high because the informational differential and the value
of the information are both high. The informational differential is high
because the distance between the competing cognitive elements of (1)
“this person is a friend” and (2) “this person is trying to defraud me” is
significant, and the value of the information is significant because the
information is of a type that would have a material effect on the victim’s
life.
C. Finding Consonance at the Cost of Objectivity
There are methods to reduce dissonance constructively, keeping
the subject in alignment with the objective reality.135 This usually
requires an active approach: (1) changing a behavior, (2) changing a
belief, or (3) changing an environmental element.136
A rational approach allows for consonance and objective clarity.
When the above changes are made rationally—for example, our victim
of fraud from above, motivated by the news report, undertakes a course
of action to investigate the issue to determine which of the two beliefs
is objectively truthful—the individual can resolve the conflicting
information by eliminating the false cognitive element, allowing a return
to consonance.
But sometimes, cognitive dissonance fails the individual. By
Festinger’s model—consciously or unconsciously137—a person can
create new facts or beliefs that reduce or eliminate the dissonance,
placing them internally—psychologically—in consonance.138 When a
change in belief is discordant with reality—when a person distinguishes
a fact by inventing new facts or investing belief in low-quality

133 FESTINGER, supra note 127, at 16. A “cognitive element” is largely undefined but
consists of fact, impression, belief, or groups thereof. See id. at 9–11.
134 Id. at 18.
135 For the purposes of this Comment, not seeking to become “too philosophical,” we
will refer to objective reality as the standard by which offenders will be measured in
suit, as opposed to their own subjective machinations.
136 See FESTINGER, supra note 127, at 19–23 (discussing changing behavior and
environment, and then using a literature-based hypothetical model in discussing
options to bring a population back to objectivity, and why an alternative may prevail).
137 See Conscious and Unconscious, infra note 143.
138 See FESTINGER, supra note 127, at 23 (describing how a community imagines ghosts
as a way to eliminate the cognitive dissonance created between a belief in humanity’s
inherent goodness and adolescent malevolence).
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information—this reduces the individual’s internal dissonance but still
leaves the individual at odds with objective reality.139
Why create new information instead of resolving things
objectively? Practical limitations—such as a high cost or a sunk
investment—may offer strong incentives against changing a behavior or
a belief.140 And environmental elements—such as the status of a
product or an FDA decision—may be clear and unchangeable, like the
weather at the park, but frequently environmental elements are
ambiguous and difficult to navigate, like an agency’s recommendation
or a scientific result; additionally, environment elements are often
external and, therefore, inherently resistive to change.141 Finally,
another roadblock to changing behavior, belief, or environment is that
changing one cognitive element may place that element in dissonance
with another cognitive element, creating integrated resistance to
change.142
But what of our victim of fraud from above? The weight of old
information may cause the victim to invent a new fact to distinguish the
dissonant information: perhaps someone is targeting the fraudster with
a smear campaign, the accuser has a case of mistaken identity, or this
was malicious reporting. That new fact allows the victim to continue to
operate without compromising his existing beliefs—placing the victim
in relative consonance. The path of least resistance may lead the victim
to decide143 that this was “fake news,” and the defrauder has been
maligned or slandered. This fraud victim may keep investing. To the
outside world, it may seem as though the victim should know the truth,
but the victim continues to invest with the fraudster.
139 See id. at 23 (detailing how the creation of a new belief can eliminate the original
dissonance, but potentially at the cost of objective reality). Festinger discusses
individuals who manufacture the concept of “ghosts” in order to diminish their internal
cognitive dissonance, id.—but by inventing ghosts, the individuals have inherently put
themselves out of phase with objective reality.
140 See id. at 24–26 (discussing resistance to changing behaviors).
141 See id. at 20–21, 26–27 (discussing changing an environmental element and the
resistive nature of making the change).
142 Id. at 27.
143 The level at which the manufacturing of this new fact is conscious, or
subconscious, is not necessarily clear: there are competing theories. See Jack Anthony
Cole, Individual Differences in Conscious and Unconscious Processes in Cognitive
Dissonance, 1–2 (Aug. 2004) [hereinafter Conscious and Unconscious] (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Southern Mississippi) (on file with author) (stating that the
study’s “overall results were consistent with the Defense-mechanism model,” a model
which points towards unconscious choices as the driving mechanism for dissonance
reduction). If these behaviors were entirely subconscious, this would raise concerns
about the applicable mens rea because the actor would not be capable of having
awareness of his or her own recklessness.
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D. Maintaining Dissonance
Individuals can maintain states of internal dissonance under
certain circumstances.
Countervailing forces—other cognitive
elements with a higher magnitude of dissonance—may also enable an
individual to maintain a state of cognitive dissonance internally, which
would also be dissonant from an objective third-party observer.144
Looking to our above victim of investment fraud, the victim may
not be able to rectify the dissonance, as there may be other dissonant
facts that the new fact balances against. For instance, the original
dilemma was the conflict between (1) the belief that the fraudster was
actually a friend who was looking out for your best interests, and (2) a
news report that the fraudster was, in fact, a fraudster. Now imagine the
victim hears from his brother who says (3) the brother made a lot of
money from the fraudster: it worked! And then (4) another colleague
reports that the fraudster is being indicted. Now there are four
dissonant facts, some balancing against each other. The victim must
weigh the value of each fact—the source of the information and the
authoritative quality—but those are also balanced against the outcome
the victim may be reliant on seeing: not being defrauded by the
fraudster. This victim may live in an uncomfortable state of internal
dissonance for a prolonged period, looking for more information to “tip
the scales.”
Keeping the above in mind, we have identified two potential routes
to functioning in an objectively external state of cognitive dissonance:
(1) significant leverage provided by a competing cognitive element with
greater magnitude or (2) successfully distinguishing the dissonant
elements by generating new facts or beliefs or reprocessing ambiguous,
existing facts. From an external, impartial, third-party observer, the
conclusion can appear the same: the subject is functioning while relying
on the “truth” of two conflicting cognitive elements. But internally,
friction and self-awareness are reduced under the latter option as the
dissonance is eliminated or significantly reduced, squashing the drive in
the subject to identify and rectify the problem. This means the victim
under route one is uncomfortable and seeking resolution, while the
victim who takes route two has eased his discomfort and has ceased to
look for an alternative solution.

144

See FESTINGER, supra note 127, at 27.
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E. Cognitive Easing: Leveraging Induction to Artificially Reduce
Dissonance
Just as the government uses quantitative easing to buoy the
economy while avoiding direct handouts, corporate managers can use
cognitive easing to adjust facts to suit their needs at the time without
electing to “lie.”
Quantitative easing allows the government to print up new money
and disburse it to a bank through a private securities purchase. 145 Then
that bank applies the money to businesses to slowly buoy the economy,
allowing the government to avoid treacherous economic dips without
directly addressing the problem.146
Similarly, cognitive dissonance can be reduced by a form of
cognitive easing,147 allowing the brain to generate new facts—or
distinguishing features—and apply them to dissonant cognitive
elements to gently bring them into consonance.148 The higher the
magnitude of dissonance the more difficult it will be to ease the two
elements into consonance,149 and thus, likely, the more cognizant the
actor will be of the process due to the difficulty in rectifying the
differential. Like tension on a suspension bridge, dissonance can be
maintained when the resolution of that dissonance—consonance—
comes at a cost of greater dissonance between other cognitive
elements.150
Imagine the typical manager of a public company: while that
individual has been forged through the challenging process of rising to
the C-Suite, it is likely that person—like a statistically significant
number of people—believes herself to be “psychologically normal,”

145 See Quantitative Easing, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 15, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/q/quantitative-easing.asp.
146 See id.
147 “Cognitive ease” has been defined by Daniel Kahneman as a state of mental being
while engaging in a system of thinking. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 59
(2011). Here, cognitive easing is being used without attempting to access the depth of
analysis Kahneman undertakes, but merely to represent a process in which the brain
attempts to mitigate dissonance—this is harmonious with Kahneman’s use of the word
but not anchored to it.
148 FESTINGER, supra note 127, at 21–23. This might be seen as relating to “the path of
least resistance.”
149 See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
But, notably, the greater the
magnitude, the stronger the drive will be to ease the two items into consonance.
FESTINGER, supra note 127, at 18.
150 FESTINGER, supra note 127, at 28–29.
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valuing morality and considering herself ethical.151 So how does a
normal, ethical person misrepresent facts to the investors—to whom
she owes fiduciary duties—and thus commit securities violations?
A variety of psychological motivations and states can provide
easing functionality and incentives to ease new cognitive elements, such
as motivated blindness,152 time pressure,153 irrational loss aversion,154
and overconfidence.155
One key mechanism behind cognitive easing is incrementalism.
Incrementalism looks at the small steps people take, sequenced over
time, that eventually can take managers from ethical street to SEC
Blvd.156 Scholars have referred to incrementalism as the “Slippery Slope
of Decision Making.”157 There are two key contributing factors to this
process: (1) numbing through repetition and (2) induction.158 Numbing

151 Crucible, supra note 122, at 4 (citing Max H. Bazerman & Francesca Gino,
Behavioral Ethics: Toward a Deeper Understanding of Moral Judgment and Dishonesty, 8
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 85, 85–104 (2012)).
152 Motivated blindness can allow managers to develop tunnel vision, ignoring key
facts under the guise of issues being “unclear, uncertain, deferred, or simply not in the
frame of reference” of the given moment. Crucible, supra note 122, at 6. Notably, this
phenomenon does not require dishonesty in the subject’s appraisal of the facts but can
occur despite good intentions and conflict awareness. See Max H. Bazerman & Ann E.
Tenbrunsel, Ethical Breakdowns, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 2011) [hereinafter Ethical
Breakdowns] (noting relevant conflicts of interest in an organization and subsequently
relying on integrity is not, alone, sufficient “because honest people can suffer from
motivated blindness”).
153 The pressure of key launch dates—or IPOs, capital raises, or quarterly reports—
can greatly impede a manager’s willingness to stop and consider the full ethical
ramifications of their actions. See Crucible, supra note 122, at 6–7 (discussing a social
experiment where unhurried people stopped to help a “groaning man collapsed in a
doorway”; sixty-three percent of students did so under typical conditions, but under
time constraints, only ten percent stopped to help).
154 Many people are irrationally motivated to stop a loss, rather than to achieve an
equivalent gain—and will increase their willingness to take risks or violate ethical
standards in order to prevent that loss. Crucible, supra note 122, at 7 (discussing the
effect of “prospect theory,” and how it applies in the C-Suite).
155 Overconfidence can lead to managers taking on additional risk; and when that
overconfidence is reinvigorated by “early success in high-risk initiatives,” that hindsight
allows the manager to recalibrate—discounting the prior risk—and then “‘double down’
on risky business going forward.” Crucible, supra note 122, at 8.
156 See id. at 5.
157 Id. at 5 & n.18 (citing Anne E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The
Role of Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RSCH. 223, 228–29 (2004))
(connecting incrementalism—”small steps”—with an article on the “Slippery Slope of
Decision Making”).
158 Anne E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception
in Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RSCH. 223, 228 (2004) [hereinafter Ethical Fading].
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occurs when actions are repetitious, and one becomes less aware or
reflective of the substance of the action.159
For example, imagine a pharmaceutical executive who receives a
report indicating a small percentage decrease in effectiveness. This
executive may note that this is not a material change in efficacy. But
over time, there may be many of these reports. Induction allows the
executive to perceive the small variable as being imperceptibly different
from the original value, and numbness—the repeated application of this
induction—can inhibit recognizing a growing downward trend. This
compounding error is only more troubling and likely to occur when it
involves cryptic soft-data—such as reports, opinions, or more
complicated, multi-vector data outputs—instead of clear numeric
values that are more likely to be discovered through diligent
monitoring.
Induction is the process where the human mind is incapable of
accounting for a small enough change in circumstances—the mind
determines that this new cognitive element is “almost identical” to a
previous cognitive element that was deemed to be acceptable and
ethical. Therefore, it allows the mind to accept the new cognitive
element as being in alignment with the prior elements.160
The above forces tie together to allow, in varying recipes, objective
individual cognitive dissonance in the C-Suite. Once competing
cognitive elements are introduced—for example, a drug will be
successful but requires more capital (“thought 1”), and a new,
perceived-to-be adverse FDA notice could, if known, jeopardize the
investor confidence needed to raise capital (“thought 2”)—time
pressure and irrational loss aversion work to establish an immovable
force in the mind of the manager. These increase the magnitude of the
dissonant cognitive elements exponentially as pressure mounts on the
manger to perform. The manager is then driven to eliminate the
dissonance: that manager may change the belief that a capital raise is
required or engage in cognitively reshaping of the dissonant element to
eliminate the conflict—either will bring these two thoughts into
consonance.161 On the one hand, to bring these two elements into

159 Ethical Fading, supra note 158. The more times a person repeats the same action
without adverse consequences, the more reaffirmed that action is; therefore, that action
may become the new norm, establishing a new baseline prior to the next induction step.
See id.
160 Id.
161 See FESTINGER, supra note 127, at 19–23 (discussing changing behavior and
environment, and then using a literature-based hypothetical model, discussing options
to bring a population back to objectivity, and why, alternatively, distinguishing the facts
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consonance, the manager would have to determine that additional
funding is not required, or secure it from a new source: this may be more
costly, less rewarding, and it requires a change in course, breaking
momentum. On the other hand, motivated blindness may allow the
manager to discount environmental, cognitive elements—such as the
status of an FDA notice—as being unclear or uncertain.162 Once the
environmental, cognitive element of the FDA notice is distinguished and
minimalized, it may be interpreted, through induction, as being
equivalent to a prior, insignificant update, unworthy of a mandatory
disclosure.163 Now the problem has been resolved without a change in
course—instead, it only required a mild psychological deviation.
But how does one manager’s cognitive dissonance expand to
encompass the entire C-Suite and the Board of Directors? The culture of
each C-Suite is particular in and of itself, and often group norms can set
the “dominant reference point for acceptable or expected behavior.”164
It is also essential to note that each manager will have their own sense
of ethics—some more than others—which sometimes means knowingly
unethical conduct-driven incrementalism might still play a role with
some of the actors.165 Additionally, the stakes are high: even if new
information indicates to the person that past actions—taken by them or
someone else in management—may have been in error, the person is
now forced to choose between surrender—sacrificing career or lifestyle
and potentially facing civil or criminal penalties—or trudging ahead,
hoping to elude notice of stockholders and regulators.166 At some point,
even if the actor becomes aware of the ethical violation, the stakes may
appear too insurmountable to attempt to mitigate or seek help, and thus
risking calling attention to the error in the process. Either way, the
individual is not only disincentivized from acting at that juncture but
also from making herself aware of the scope of the problem altogether.

with new—self-generated—information may provide a more optimal solution to the
subject, though it may be objectively invalid).
162 Crucible, supra note 122, at 6.
163 See Ethical Fading, supra note 158.
164 See “groupthink,” described in Crucible, supra note 122, at 9–10.
165 See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text (discussing a willful fraud
perpetrated by one key actor and abetted by other employees who may have had lower
mens rea states in their participation).
166 See Crucible, supra note 122, at 5–6.

HEROD (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

11/12/21 3:49 PM

COMMENT

637

F. Applying Corporate Cognitive Dissonance to Life Science
Companies
Cognitive dissonance in life science companies begins with
management doing exactly what they are trained to do: problem solve
and maintain a positive disposition to the investors despite any speed
bumps.167 Cognitive dissonance is applicable here in two primary ways:
First, cognitive dissonance is required to maintain a separation of self: a
person can simultaneously believe they are an ethical person, while
making choices that escalate in ethical risk. The Max H. Bazerman and
Ann E. Tenbrunsel discuss this phenomenon in the context of the Ford
Pinto case:
[L]ooking at their decision through a modern lens—one that
takes into account a growing understanding of how cognitive
biases distort ethical decision making—we come to a different
conclusion. We suspect that few if any of the executives
involved in the Pinto decision believed that they were making
an unethical choice. Why? Apparently because they thought
of it as purely a business decision rather than an ethical one.168
There, the two dissonant thoughts involved the individuals’ selfperceptions as ethical beings and the knowledge that there was
significant potential for death. Bazerman and Tenbrunsel state that the
executives decided it was a “business decision,” and therefore
distinguishable from their own personal moral and ethical compass—
and this may be seen as a version of motivated blindness,169 because it
demonstrates the mind working to eliminate the dissonance by
redefining the nature of the environmental fact.170

167 Problem solving includes persistence and “resilience to withstand inevitable
pushback from co-workers.” What Are Problem-solving Skills and Why Are They
Important?, CAREERBUILDER (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.careerbuilder.com/advice/
what-are-problemsolving-skills-and-why-are-they-important (a web article designed
for instructing younger, would-be-managers on what it takes to be a manager); Margo
Reder, CEO Postings - Leveraging the Internet’s Communications Potential While
Managing the Message to Maintain Corporate Governance Interests in Information
Security, Reputation and Compliance, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L. J. 179, 186–87 (2009)
(“CEOs necessarily focus on competition, customers, and markets in an effort to achieve
maximum returns for the corporation. The temptation to leverage advantages through
any means available is nearly irresistible.”).
168 Ethical Breakdowns, supra note 152 (emphasis added).
169 Motivated blindness does not necessarily rise to the legal concept of “willful
blindness.” Motivated blindness is merely suggesting that there is an incentive to
remain blind and does not specifically speak to a conscious attempt to remain blind. See
Crucible, supra note 122, at 6, for a discussion of motivated blindness in business ethics.
170 FESTINGER, supra note 127, at 20–21 (noting that environmental cognitive
elements can already be ambiguous in nature).
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Second, cognitive dissonance can allow managers to, on the one
hand, understand the materiality of a problem in order to affect internal
operational actions to remedy the problem while mentally declaring the
materiality moot in regard to their investor-facing communications.
When new, adverse information presents itself to a manager, that
manager generally must acknowledge the severity of the issue—for
example, a relevant legal notice, an alert triggered by an employee, or a
data breach—by taking action to remedy the situation. The level of
alarm raised here may be seen to inform the seriousness to which the
manager regards the situation. Yet, despite the seriousness of actions
required, that manager may then be motivated to disregard the
seriousness as it applies to material disclosures under Section 10(b).
Objectively, one may imagine a trend to exist: if the element was a
serious element in one category, it might likely be of material value to
the investors. That is not to declare that these are always identical,
merely that this should raise the question. But that ambiguity creates
room for motivated blindness to repackage the dissatisfactory cognitive
element, distinguishing it from a dangerous fact that would induce
internal cognitive dissonance. Additionally, incrementalism can be seen
here to allow a subject to conflate additional investigative reports
regarding an employee’s bad actions—where prior notices were
deemed immaterial to global operations—as indistinguishable from
past notifications through induction and, should these actions repeat,
numbness. This incremental “drips and drabs” way of gathering
information can appear, on the surface, to keep the manager apprised of
the necessary details, but, in reality, it may reduce the manager’s ability
to comprehend the ultimate severity of the calamity. Whereas, if the full
extent of the employee’s maleficence was delivered to the manager at
one time, it may have been sufficient to register as a material breach.
But the slow build to that same fact pattern may allow induction and
numbness to eliminate the manager’s cognitive dissonance and reduce
the manager’s objective reaction.
Life science companies typically spend significantly on research
and development, so when problems arise with the medication or the
manufacturing process, the solution often requires more money.171 And
the problems, at first, may well be immaterial in regard to mandatory
investor disclosures. But when the materiality line is incredibly thin and
gray, it is easy to succumb to cognitive dissonance: reframing the

171

See Millions, supra note 64.
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adverse facts into a light more favorable and solvable.172 Given the highstakes situation of being dependent on the FDA’s approval of one or two
pharmaceuticals for revenue, it is understandably easy to find oneself
faced with hard disclosure decisions.
Specifically, when a Form 483 is presented to the business, the
form is fairly clear about what issues it is indicating.173 But the Form
483 will likely not prescribe solutions to those issues.174 This leaves a
manager with a dilemma: the manager needs to fix the issues—and may
need capital to do it—but the manager, between time pressure and
irrational loss aversion, will be motivated to avoid identifying the Form
483 elements as material to investors—doing so would derail the
company’s current investor strategy and likely make it impossible to
solve the problem, entering into a downward spiral of potential losses.
This manager must simultaneously know the problem is serious enough
to deploy resources to solve it and believe it is not so serious that it has
to be reported. If the pressure of these two items is not enough, the
manager can deploy a variety of diffusion tactics to obfuscate the
severity: from refusing to anticipate the potential binary (and possibly
devastating) outcome of a CLR, to deciding that the FDA parameters or
potential outcomes are too confusing to really understand. This is step
one for incrementalism. And once there is psychological momentum175
built up in the manager’s mind, objects in motion tend to stay in motion.
G. Taking a Second Look at Atossa with Cognitive Dissonance in
Mind
Now, after reviewing cognitive dissonance in the life science’s CSuite, a fresh look at Atossa calls into question whether Schmid’s
framing of the case as being driven by “confusion” is entirely satisfactory
or whether cognitive dissonance might prove an alternative—if not
more likely—explanation.
In Atossa, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a motion to dismiss the
district court granted in favor of Atossa Genetics.176 The court affirmed
172 Crucible, supra note 122, at 5 (“In the process of resolving that one internal
conflict, [managers] have created, accepted and internalized an ideology for justifying
future infractions, especially if they are small and arise in a similar context.”).
173 FDA FAQ, supra note 69.
174 Id.
175 James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law
Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFFALO L. REV. 249, 257–58 (2001) (discussing
sophisticated investors being “caught up in the same psychological momentum
sweeping over executives and board members” in the context of return-promising
mergers and, therefore, not fully scrutinizing transactions).
176 Levi v. Atossa Genetics, Inc., 868 F.3d 784, 789–90 (9th Cir. 2017).
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in part and reversed in part.177 Atossa had two primary revenue
sources: MASCT System and ForeCYTE Test.178 The MASCT System had
received a limited FDA-certification “for use in collecting NAF
samples.”179 Steven Quay, Atossa’s CEO, made a statement in a Form 8K report on December 20, 2012, that included an indication that
ForeCYTE was “FDA-cleared.”180 Additionally, on News-Medical.net,
Quay was quoted as saying that ForeCYTE “has gone through all of the
FDA clearance process” (“Incident One”).181 In one instance, Atossa
correctly described the FDA clearance of its MASCT System in its IPO
documents, stating that it had received limited FDA-certification for an
express purpose; but in a separate instance in the IPO documents, the
company described the MASCT System as being fully “FDA-cleared;” this
made the product appear further along and more imminently
profitable—the court described this as Atossa using “less precise
language” (“Incident Two”).182 Later, on February 25, 2013, another
Form 8-K was filed, “giving notice of the FDA’s warning letter.”183 But
the notice “omitted the balance of the FDA’s alleged serious concerns”
(“Incident Three”).184 In a 10-Q report, Atossa made the statement that
the company was “‘reasonably confident in its responses’ to the FDA’s
warning letter” (“Incident Four”).185 Finally, Quay stated in an interview
on March 15, 2013, that the “FDA clearance risk has been achieved”
(“Incident Five”).186
The Ninth Circuit in Atossa affirmed the district court’s decision
from Incident Two and Incident Four—granting the motion to
dismiss.187 But the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court on Incidents
One, Three, and Five.188 Incidents One and Two were very similar, but
with a key distinction: Incident Two appears to have involved more
“confusion”—the Ninth Circuit stressed that the issue in the IPO was
centered around “less precise language,” as Atossa had left out a

177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Id. at 790.
Id. at 795.
Id. at 796.
Id. at 794.
Id.
Atossa, 868 F.3d at 796.
Id. at 797.
Id.
Id. at 799.
Id. at 800–01.
Id. at 793, 797, 800.
Atossa, 868 F.3d at 793, 796, 799, 802–03.

HEROD (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

11/12/21 3:49 PM

COMMENT

641

qualifying fact around the FDA clearance; Incident One, on the other
hand, imputed an FDA approval from one key product to the other.189
Notably, while there may have been some confusion related to the
scope of FDA approval, or the process in which responses to FDA
warning letters is handled, by all appearances, the dominant driver in
this case was a series of actions that crossed the line from “mere
corporate optimism” and waltzed right into a conscious disregard of
material, known facts.190 Over the course of three months, Atossa’s
management attempted to make their product, ForeCYTE, appear
further along and more imminently profitable—it seems like an unlikely
coincidence that every “confused” notion about the FDA approval
process skewed in Atossa’s favor. Looking at this case through the lens
of cognitive dissonance, it is easy to imagine convenient cognitive easing
that may have led to these beneficial misinterpretations of FDA notices.
H. Why May Cognitive Dissonance Be Relevant in These Cases?
When an actor does not understand the nature of his actions, he
cannot seek help to avoid current, prevent future, or remedy past
incidents. This likely means that deterrents lose effect because when a
person cannot understand that the very nature of their actions may
trigger a legal consequence, that deterrent does not have value to that
individual.191 And this leaves us with a key difference between a subject
affected by cognitive dissonance and a subject who acts knowingly in
order to exploit the system: the person knowingly doing it is, in fact, selfaware of the problem and can, therefore, seek legal counsel to best
rectify the situation. On the other hand, the person who is experiencing
internally consonant, objective cognitive dissonance is not aware and
therefore less likely to realize that she requires counsel, nor would she
be willing to entertain the severity of her actions in discussions with
counsel. A manager might be the top of her field, supported by a variety
of able, intelligent people who know better, yet it is still possible for her
to delude herself into believing that the problem is immaterial to
investors, despite its materiality to business operations.
Despite the actor’s reality-distortion-field, establishing culpability
is still possible. Under Section 10(b)’s scienter requirement, as noted

Id. at 794, 796.
Id. at 803 (internal citations omitted).
191 When an actor cannot anticipate the impropriety of their action, increased
deterrents have little to no effect. See Kara M. McCarthy, Note, Doing Time for Clinical
Crime: The Prosecution of Incompetent Physicians as an Additional Mechanism to Assure
Quality Health Care, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 569, 616–17 (1997) (describing a theory that
it is unjust and ineffective to hold doctors liable for inadvertent bad acts).
189
190
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above, we must look to determine if the actor’s mens rea, at the time of
the conduct, rose to recklessness. Even the (presently) unaware actor
made choices, at the onset of the issue, to eliminate the cognitive
dissonance. Given that this is a sophisticated actor, with fiduciary duties
to the company, the initial state of dissonance—in concert with the high
stakes and knowledge of the situation—would likely make the actor
“consciously aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk.”192 The drive
to eliminate internal cognitive dissonance relates to “a desire not to
know there is a risk,” and indeed, “the causing of the belief is something
the person does himself,” making the actor, if only for that initial fleeting
moment, culpable under Section 10(b)’s scienter requirement.193 This,
however, only justifies these civil actions under the law; it does not
answer the dominating question: How do we discourage this behavior
in an effort to protect investors while decreasing costly litigation?
VI. POSSIBLE PATHS FORWARD
Despite critics of class action securities litigation,194 there do
appear to be benefits—such as establishing confidence and protection
for investors, allowing individual shareholders who otherwise lack the
means to bring an action to bring one, and deterring wrongful or
misleading actions by directors.195 Some suggest that the system is
generally working.196
But even if the system is working, the expense businesses could
avoid must be noted: $6 billion is spent in settlements per year197—and
$1 billion of that constitutes attorney’s fees.198 And yes, billions more
are lost trying to prevent expensive litigation or because shareholders
deflate value in anticipation of litigation.199 Expensive “Directors and
Michael S. Moore & Heidi M. Hurd, Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak,
and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 147, 179 (2011)
[hereinafter Culpability of Negligence].
193 Id. at 155 (emphasis added).
194 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming The Securities Class Action: An Essay On
Deterrence And Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1547 (2006) (“[I]t is an open
question as to whether the typical securities class action settlement actually produces
any net recovery.”).
195 See Nicole A. Veno, Note, Class Action Securities Lawsuits Should Survive the Death
of a Named Defendant: Why Baillargeon v. Sewell was Wrongly Decided, 25 QUINNIPIAC
PROB. L. J. 408, 411–12 (2012).
196 Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under the Radar, 2009
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 802, 806 (2009) (“[P]ost-PSLRA securities fraud class action is
reasonably effective in achieving both compensatory and deterrence goals.”).
197 Consequences, supra note 10, at 2–3.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 3.
192
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Officers” insurance coverage increases cost burdens.200 And in 2019, out
of all securities class action lawsuits, twenty-four percent were filed
against life sciences companies.201
In order to address the peculiar situations that arise with public life
sciences companies, this Comment will now look at several narrow
opportunities that may provide relief, deterrence, or encourage
prevention, with an eye toward diminishing the need for class action
securities lawsuits by prophylactically discouraging the harmful
behavior. It is important to note that even as the industry looks to make
changes, the courts have been altering the burdens placed on both
plaintiffs and defendants—and while there are certainly still fair
protections for the defendants, as misrepresentations continue, the
courts respond in one of the only ways they can: increasing deterrence
by allowing plaintiff actions to progress to the merits.202
In order to apply the learnings from above, it seems essential to
view potential solutions in relation to how they might disrupt the
slippery slope of induction that allows for individuals and teams to
neutralize their internal cognitive dissonance while remaining
objectively out of alignment with reality. The very nature of the FDA
approval process creates incredible opportunities for induction, as it is
replete with incremental, short-step changes. Globally, solutions that
encourage managers to confront these changes by causing disruption
would seem to offer a higher efficacy rate. The challenge will be to
Id. at 20.
Kevin M. LaCroix, A Closer Look at 2019 Securities Litigation Against Life Sciences
Companies, D&O DIARY (Jan. 26, 2020), https://www.dandodiary.com/2020/01/articles/securities-litigation/a-closer-look-at-2019-securities-litigation-against-life-sciences-companies/.
202 Class action securities litigation, even a decade after the PSLR, is still seeing
fluctuations in how courts balance the burdens on the plaintiffs and defendants during
the initial phases of a suit. For example, the 2010 Supreme Court ruling in Halliburton
Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. has changed how defendants must deal with loss causation
prior to class certification. 573 U.S. 258, 284 (2014). While it does create a presumption
of reliance, making the plaintiff’s case easier, it allows the defense to rebut the
presumption prior to class action certification. See id. at 277–79. In Halliburton, the
Court held that requiring a plaintiff to prove reliance or “price-impact” created too high
of a bar for class action securities litigation to be established. See id. at 267–68, 278–79.
The Second Circuit pushed to broaden potential plaintiffs through their expanded
inflation-maintenance theory; the Supreme Court, reviewing the Second Circuit’s
decision, discussed the inflation-maintenance theory but did not validate (or invalidate)
the theory, instead, remanding the case for the insufficient consideration of the generic
quality of statements on the materiality prong. See Ark. Tchr. Ret. Sys. v. Goldman Sachs
Grp., Inc., 955 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2020), rev’d, Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc v. Ark. Tchr.
Ret. Sys., 141 S. Ct. 1951, 1960–61 (2021). A continued lowering of the barrier to enter
a Section 10(b) suit may encourage compliance, but there are likely problems with this
as a solution. See 20-4 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: CLASS ACTIONS 5 (2020).
200
201
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determine, systematically, how to embed the right disruption points to
elicit positive behavior changes, as opposed to generating more
bureaucracy.
With that guiding principle in mind, the following sections will
briefly identify a few possible, narrow paths forward: (1) opportunities
for reformations to the FDA notifications and guidance; (2) mandating
disclosures, under the SEA, of any FDA notifications; (3) creating a
presumption of disclosure for any—or certain enumerated—
communications between the FDA and the business; and (4) creating a
“safe harbor” approach for determining appropriate disclosures.
A. Reform FDA Notifications and Guidance
The FDA could deploy superior guidance relevant to its
notifications and the SEA at either a global level or with a piecemeal
approach. Fraud or Confusion offers up a version of FDA reform targeted
at globally issued guidance:
The FDA must create comprehensive guidance that
establishes and provides examples of best disclosure
practices during the drug approval process. Such guidance
would help companies determine how the FDA will respond
to a fact, which subsequently affects the materiality of that
fact. Ideally it would provide strategies whereby companies
could effectively match the scope of their disclosure to the
severity of FDA criticism and skepticism.203
The above solution seems very applicable—and helpful—to a rational
actor who is not swayed by the effects of cognitive dissonance; however,
taking the globally issued option and parsing it against the concepts of
cognitive dissonance, above, it is challenging to see this as a significant
solution on a case-by-case basis. As considered above, an FDA notice is
a form of environmental element. Environmental elements, as noted,
are external and inherently difficult to change. But the more ambiguous
environmental elements are, the easier they become to distinguish
because the ambiguity creates opportunities to reshape the facts.
Therefore, providing clearer FDA guidance may serve to refine the
resolution of information, making it more difficult to falsely distinguish
the information.
Alternatively, the second option requires an immense
reapportionment of resources on the part of the FDA—this seems too
much to ask, given budget constraints. But perhaps an amalgamation of
these two concepts: global guidance is issued, and with it a simple

203

Fraud or Confusion, supra note 90, at 1932 (emphasis added).
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framework is laid out. For example, the guidance would indicate (1) the
number of opportunities to correct the problem afforded the company,
(2) a simple color code for the severity of the issue, and (3) a clear
timeline of events—perhaps simplified, specific example timelines—
then, in conjunction with the global guidance that explains these
elements, the FDA could include specific color coding and timeline
relationships with each notice.
In the context of ethical actors under the influence of cognitive
dissonance, clear, bold warnings that may disrupt the regular flow of
communication could serve to jar the actor out of complacency.
B. Mandatory FDA Disclosures Under the SEA
Another possible path forward is to mandate FDA disclosures.204
This would work by requiring every company to disclose, in a Form 8K, the action letter sent by the FDA within a period of time (redactions
of intellectual property would be permitted).205 Deterring Fraud:
Mandatory Disclosure cites three potential criticisms of this plan: (1)
concerns with protecting proprietary data; (2) “information overload”
for investors; and (3) concerns about the market overreacting to the
disclosure.206 These may be valid reasons not to execute this plan, but,
assuming, arguendo, that these are irrelevant, this solution still leaves a
glaring flaw: it assumes that the only material information is
information sent to the company by the FDA, and not messaging the
company sends to the FDA. As seen above, these action letters often
form a sort of “conversation” between the company and the FDA—
sometimes the conversation includes actual, verbalized dialogue, as
well.
Still, by requiring managers to disclose these FDA notifications, this
works to eliminate one of the key decisions that can lead to objective
cognitive dissonance in the life sciences sector. It does, however, still
leave the potential for misrepresentations or omissions in how the
business discloses communications from the business to the FDA. If the
mandatory disclosure scheme was extended to require communications
that occur both ways, between the company and the FDA, that may go a
long way to eliminate potential sticky points for Section 10(b)

204 Liora Sukhatme, Deterring Fraud: Mandatory Disclosure and the FDA Drug
Approval Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1236 (2007) [hereinafter Mandatory].
205 Id. at 1237.
206 Id. at 1239–42.
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violations.207 Though, on the flip side, there is a potential for increased
bureaucracy and information oversaturation for investors.
C. Presumption of Disclosure
A variation on the mandatory disclosure approach would be to
create a presumption of disclosure. This would create a presumption
that, every time there was an FDA notice or communication from the
company to the FDA, the company should have disclosed a reasonable
rendition of that communication, allowing for the removal of any
intellectual property or trade secret. If the company has complied, then
the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the company clearly
misrepresented a fact—this would allow for significant protections
against potential claims of material omissions under Rule 10b-5, should
companies comply. If a company has not filed a disclosure, then the
burden would shift back to the company to show why a disclosure was
not necessary. This acts as a double-edged knife, serving both as a
deterrent and an opportunity for safe harbor.
This may be seen as a mild version of the mandatory disclosure
scheme. The permissive nature of this plan allows for more flexibility in
business management, but, in turn, increases the potential for cognitive
dissonance to enable managers to run afoul of disclosure requirements
without being fully aware of the misalignment. Still, this works to
eliminate some bureaucracy, and potentially reduce the number of
disclosures, versus the mandatory disclosure scheme, that would
saturate the investors. The safe harbor aspect of this approach allows
for businesses to, in a healthy way, take advantage of this law to their
own protection while still accomplishing the goal: deterring
misrepresentations.
D. A Special Disclosure Committee
A committee designed after the Special Litigation Committee
(“SLC”) model208 could create a safe harbor opportunity for companies.
An SLC can be formed by impartial, Qualified Directors who can assess
whether a derivative suit is appropriate against the individual directors
of the corporation—by using impartial Qualified Directors, the SLC

207 This would need to include an ability to redact sensitive, proprietary information
and data.
208 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 1.43, 7.44 (1969) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2020)
(defining “Qualified Director” and the “Dismissal” power prescribed to a special
committee of Qualified Directors).
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reduces the burden on the court system by eliminating potentially
frivolous suits.209
Fashioning a Special Disclosure Committee (“SDC”) could have
clear benefits by empowering an impartial group to make final
disclosure decisions, and, due to their impartiality, offer some level of
subsequent liability insulation. But given that the issues here revolve
around securities class action litigation—direct actions by
shareholders—and not derivative actions, there are some key
differences, and thus, clear alterations that must be made between the
SLC model and a theoretical SDC. For instance, an SDC, unlike the SLC,
would not be capable of dismissing litigation—nor should it.210 That
being said, directors—and thus, Qualified Directors under the Model
Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”)211—would still have fiduciary
duties to the shareholders, regardless of the direct action.212 The end
result would be to create an SDC that—similar to how an audit
committee requires at least one expert in Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (“GAAP”)—might have at least one Qualified
Director with a legal background—or legal compliance certification—as
well as a Qualified Director who would be deemed an expert in
pharmaceuticals or the FDA approval process. Each Qualified Director
would have (1) fiduciary duties to the shareholders,213 (2) no “material
relationship”214 with any of the managing directors, and (3) should not
have a “material interest”215 in the firm itself.
The SDC would function by choosing the scope of disclosure
concerning FDA notifications and company correspondence with the
FDA. If the procedures are followed correctly, then the presumption—
rebuttable by plaintiff—in any dismissal motion or class action
certification, is that company directors did not have the requisite
See id.
Providing the power of dismissal, even if it were possible, would likely give the
SDC too much power to eliminate lawsuits.
211 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 1.43, 8.30 (“[Q]ualified directors” are a defined subset
of directors, and directors must operate “in good faith” and “in a manner the director
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”).
212 Andrew D. Shaffer, Corporate Fiduciary - Insolvent: The Fiduciary Relationship
Your Corporate Law Professor (Should Have) Warned You About, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
479, 490 n.39 (2000).
213 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30; see also Shaffer, supra note 212.
214 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.43(b)(1). If the director were otherwise employed by the
firm or another director or had a personal or familial relationship with another director,
that would disqualify the director from serving in this capacity. See id.
215 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.43(b)(2). Owning shares should not preclude a director
from serving here; however, owning an amount of the firm that “would reasonably be
expected to impair the objectivity of the director’s judgment,” id., should disqualify such
a person from serving in this capacity.
209
210
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scienter. If the SDC procedures are not followed, then safe harbor does
not apply. The SDC allows a company to protect itself and ensure it
makes the appropriate disclosures to investors as well.
By placing disclosure authority in an independent committee, the
SDC, it would migrate the decision from managers who are entrenched
with the problem, giving a more objective, third party a different
vantage point to see the disclosure issues. By eliminating some of the
SDC’s potential conflicting interests, the SDC’s primary motivation will
be to make the correct disclosure decision. This could add more
bureaucracy, but it also provides an opportunity for a business that
recognizes it is in a risky position to protect itself prospectively.
VII. CONCLUSION
The essential takeaway of this Comment is that the combination of
the current FDA notification process and required SEA disclosure
requirements create a perfect storm of circumstances that encourage
actors to obviate their cognitive dissonance by small, step-change
induction, which allows managers to detach themselves from objective
reality, creating material omissions and misstatements along the way.
While cognitive dissonance may not preclude liability under the
SEA, Section 10(b), it does diminish the potential for the manager to
foresee potential consequences and act to avoid said consequences by
positively changing their behaviors. Without this clear view to causality,
the theoretically positive effect of deterrence is diminished. Offering
businesses additional tools, such as the safe harbor of an SDC, or a
presumptive disclosure scheme, may allow businesses to be more
proactive in defending these matters. Coordinating FDA notices more
closely with SEC disclosure requirements could help to jolt some
managers from complacency. Without adjustments to the laws
surrounding FDA notifications and the SEC disclosure requirements,
small-capitalized public life science sector companies will continue to
breed opportunities for managers to, under the influence of falsely
obtained consonance, misrepresent and omit material facts to investors
without fully comprehending their conduct.

